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ABSTRACT
All doubts about the importance of reconsidering government
secrecy, openness and accountability as the post-Cold War world
confronts the Information Age are rapidly dispelled by Alasdair
Roberts' Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information
A4e. Professor Roberts explores the evolving tension between
traditional diplomatic secrecy and the increasing open nature of
modern democratic governments. In the post-Cold War world,
information sharing networks extend far beyond the bilateral
information sharing networks that pre-dominated the Cold War
world. Such arrangements often present difficulties in knowing
just who provided the original information-a problem that
accounts for a growing lack of transparency where networks are
obligated to honor the control requirements of the originating
nation. Ironically, there is transparency within the network, but
opacity to those outside the standard is no longer transparence but
translucence. Equally troublesome is the increasing amounts of
information being withheld from public disclosure under a
"sensitive but unclassified" rubric. The author argues that
information access systems have become confused as the boundary
between private and public activities, particularly with regard to
national security, have been obscured In conclusion, the author
discusses the growth of data in electronic form and finds that such
aggregate data carries with it a threat to personal privacy as well
when private organizations use such capabilities to assemble
extensive knowledge about individuals from widely distributed
public records. It is a book important for anyone concerned with
the history and future challenges of government information access
at a time offundamental change.
All doubts about the importance of reconsidering government
secrecy, openness and accountability as the post-Cold War world
confronts the Information Age are rapidly dispelled by Alasdair
Roberts' Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age.
Not everyone will agree with all of its conclusions, but no one can
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question the value of this tour de force. It is a book important for
anyone concerned with the history and future challenges of
government information access at a time of fundamental change.
Beginning with a review of the origins of government policies
controlling access to information, Professor Roberts explores the
evolving tension between traditional diplomatic secrecy and the
increasingly open nature of modem democratic governments-a theme
he uses to organize much of the discussion of this valuable
contribution. This doctrinal change, from presumed secrecy in
government matters to the people's right to know, has fundamentally
altered the nature of government. For an increasing number of
nations, the traditions of absolute governance which supported
absolute privacy and secrecy among rulers have now largely vanished.
A surprising number of countries, following the U.S.'s lead, have
enacted their own' legislation providing citizens the right to access
government information.
Nevertheless, these nations do not reflect an even and consistent
application of the laws supporting governmental openness and
accountability. Enforcement is typically a problem for those nations
that could be described as "emerging democracies," constituting the
second wave of adopters of openness laws. These nations are less
affluent and not as politically stable as those that preceded them. Too
often, government corruption is a serious problem for them. In
response, perhaps not surprisingly, many such nations have created
significant exceptions in their laws for state security. Certainly all of
them struggle with enforcement of their access laws, a process which
is both costly and heavily dependent upon sophisticated governmental
bureaucratic machinery (including record-keeping, well-trained
bureaucrats, effective court procedures and the availability of lawyers).
In fact, the adoption of these legal systems each reflects the special
history of the several nations involved. As Professor Roberts
concludes, nations have adopted access laws for a variety of reasons.
Considering the U.S. experience, he connects the advent of
government information access to the conservative response to New
Deal reforms as well as concerns about the increase in information
obtained and controlled by the newly created independent agencies.
1Professor Roberts reports that by the end of 2004, fifty-nine countries had adopted their own
Freedom of Information Act. Among those mentioned prominently are Western powers such
as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, German laender (although
not the federal government), Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Japan. More surprising,
however, are the recent adopters in emerging democracies such as Mexico, Pakistan,
Guangzhou, China, Kenya, Jamaica, Uzbekistan, Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa, and India.
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The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act, responding to this situation,
provided the ground work for the later 1966 Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). Ironically, the interest in such government accountability
through access to information shifted across the political spectrum
with Ralph Nader and environmental interests championing the new
FOIA law in the mid 1960's. Once in place, other Western
governments eventually followed the U.S. model, adopting their own
legislation. Ironically, U.S. leadership also demanded and obtained
restrictive information protection policies for its NATO allies in the
1950's.
In other cases, traumatic national experience provided the basis for
adopting freedom of information laws. Here the experience of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Paraguay and South Africa share
common origins. Even so, for some the curative power of such new
access to information laws has been limited by exceptions included in
the provisions of these laws, particularly with regard to information
involving intelligence and the military-the sources of prior
governmental abuses. In other cases, local courts have ruled in ways
that carve out portions of the bureaucracy most in need of openness
provided by information access laws. 2
In the end, while an anomaly measured against international
standards when originally enacted by the United States,3 freedom of
information laws are now considered an international standard
expected of all nations desirous of entering the world economy.4
Moreover, adopting such openness policies is now seen as a pre-
condition to creating a successful democracy. Even so, Professor
Roberts concludes that access laws may correlate with or support good
governance, but do not necessarily cause it.
This trend toward greater openness is not without its modem-day
challenges. Professor Roberts describes a variety of "head winds,"
beginning with the Bush Administration's response to current world
2 For example, both Latvia and Slovakia have had court decisions holding that there is no
"human right to classified information," while India's law excludes all nineteen of its
intelligence collection agencies.
3 Sweden and Finland appear to have been earlier adopters of their own access laws.
4 U.S. legislation in support of governmental openness includes a broad range of legislative
provisions including: the Presidential Records Act (1974), the Privacy Act (1974), the Ethics
in Government Act (1978), the Government Sunshine Act (1972), the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (1972), the Civil Service Reform Act (1978), the Inspector General Act
(1978), the General Accounting Office Act of 1980, and the Foreign Intelligence Security Act
(1998).
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threats from terrorism, as well as decisions in Australia, New Zealand
and Canada to permit the blacking-out of information in response to
governmental claims for secrecy. In short, powerful tensions between
secrecy and security have been revealed in response to the "War on
Terrorism." And, as responses to this threat have matured, Professor
Roberts sees increasing reliance on secrecy to protect government
information that might be used to harm national security. For
example, al Qaeda's caves at Tora Bora revealed an extensive study of
maps of critical U.S. infrastructure, justifying further restrictions on
the wide-spread release of such information on the intemet. This new
category of information, "critical infrastructure information," has
become the subject of increasing attention and is the justification for
the growth in another category, known as "sensitive but unclassified"
restricted information. There has also been far too little funding
support for effective implementation of access legislation in the U.S.
and elsewhere. Declassification efforts are under-funded and so, too,
are efforts required to respond to FOIA requests.
At a fundamental level, of course, the real problem now is how to
judge the value of secret information--does it support, or undercut, our
security? Here Professor Roberts makes an important point: The fact
is that in the post-Cold War world, we risk over-protecting what is
important to our security. How can citizens respond effectively to
national security threats if they do not understand them? A second
issue may be that, without transparency into government decisions,
wise choices about our security would be impossible to make. How
then do secrecy and security relate in the post-Cold War area?
In Roberts' view, "[n]ational security was compromised by the
secrecy that surrounded war planning exercises and efforts to improve
homeland security." I could not agree more. We need a far better
understanding of the world in which we live. The government's
failure to share information more readily before and after 9/11 limited
our understanding, our ability to imagine the worst, and to prepare
adequate responses.
Meanwhile, the information age is changing how governments
function, which in turn causes a rethinking of how we manage open
government. First, like many governmental officials, the current Bush
Administration has found governing in the conditions of openness that
currently exist increasingly difficult. The modem information age
makes managing information far more difficult today than in the past.
Certainly the level of information available makes controlling the
agenda of any Administration problematic. Second, there is also the
problem of "data overload." In some common law countries the
response has been to seek mechanisms for central control of
information requests, or to tighten what information can be released,
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often by imposing fees. Unfortunately, in Professor Roberts' view,
such efforts to control the release of information across the common
law world have tended to backfire, further exacerbating the underlying
crisis of government legitimacy.
Turning to the new intergovernmental structures which have
developed in the aftermath of the Cold War, Professor Roberts'
analysis challenges us to consider whether such structures have eroded
traditional openness. He describes the problems of achieving
intergovernmental collaboration when nations exist in differing states
of sophistication with regard to information control and access. In the
post-Cold War world, three information sharing networks among the
nations of the world are emerging: defense, national intelligence
agencies, and national police forces. This is the "new intelligence
order," which is both deeper and larger, based on a much broader
network of bilateral relationships. 5 These relationships extend far
beyond the bilateral information sharing networks that pre-dominated
the Cold War world. Such arrangements often present difficulties in
knowing just who provided the original information-a problem that
accounts for a growing lack of transparency where networks are
obligated to honor the control requirements of the originating nation.
The result for information access purposes is often a "lowest common
denominator" solution in which the nation least willing to allow
information to be released controls access decisions for all others.
Ironically, there is transparency within the network, but opacity to
those outside the standard is no longer transparence but translucence.
Following 9/11, this development has intensified. In Professor
Roberts' view, the amount of classified law enforcement information
has increased while the willingness to share it with the public has
diminished. Here I must dissent. I believe the problem may not be as
great as suggested. The relationship between federal and local law
enforcement authorities is an asymmetric one. The information shared
by federal authorities with local law enforcement has increased, but
not the reverse. The information is classified and local authorities
must protect it; but the public's access to it, or lack thereof, remains
the same.
On the other hand, there can be no dispute that Professor Roberts is
correct in asserting that too much information remains classified today.
Increasing amounts of information are being withheld from public
disclosure under a "sensitive but unclassified" rubric. An awareness
of the vulnerability of critical infrastructures and related systems, the
5 By way of example, forty-eight Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties are now in existence, and
forty-three nations have joined the U.N. Convention on Drug Trafficking.
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vast majority of which are controlled by the private sector, underpins
much of this conceptual framework which has been designed in an ad
hoc process to prevent its release. To be sure, more needs to be done
to structure the way in which critical infrastructure information is
managed. But, the fact that this information relates to potential
vulnerabilities of interest to our terrorist foes is unarguable. There is
certainly logic to efforts made to protect this information, even if they
are clumsy or strain current legal authorities.
Nonetheless, Professor Roberts is correct in arguing that
information access systems have become confused as the boundary
between private and public activities, particularly with regard to
national security, have been obscured. Added to this is the growing
practice of "contracting out" government services as a money-saving
response to the costs of doing business. It remains to be determined
how information access will be managed for such contracted activities.
Are they essential governmental services, subject to government
information access, or private matters, free from public scrutiny?
In sum, what should the rights to information be when formerly
government functions move to the private sector through the process
of outsourcing? Professor Roberts does not answer this question, but
provides useful analysis of considerations which will be relevant. One
answer may be that access must turn on whether information is
required to preserve traditional rights associated with citizenship. This
choice is not one that is yet embodied in U.S. law where access to
information has yet to be accorded constitutional status. Nonetheless,
at least one nation, South Africa, has taken this step, providing the
right to either public or private information in its Public Accountability
Information Act (211) as long as a need has been established. How
different is this than the U.S. approach where, little by little, access to
information has been provided in individual pieces of legislation?
Professor Roberts gives examples here as disparate as securities
legislation or students' rights to campus security information. Equally
important, but not mentioned, are the unique discovery features of the
U.S. legal system where private litigants have the right to access
private information relevant to proving asserted rights.
Turning to the growth of "supranational" institutions, Professor
Roberts makes a valuable contribution in examining the reluctance of
these organizations to adopt the full panoply of access to information
rights of their various member nations. With the notable exception of
the European Union, where access rights have been repeatedly upheld
by the European Court of Human Rights, such organizations have
reflected their diplomatic origins with a penchant for secrecy. The
World Trade Organization, the World Bank and its subsidiaries, are all
examples of organizations displaying extreme reluctance where
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freedom of information is concerned. This is a story that Professor
Roberts tells in convincing detail, documenting carefully both the
resistance and the gradual adoption of greater accountability through
openness.
As a final topic, Professor Roberts discusses the nature of the
growth of data in electronic form. This explosion has been
accompanied by new challenges of data management until the advent
of metadata and capabilities such as Electronic Document and Records
Managements Systems (EDRMS) which enable sorting and assessing
the content of vast data sets. Disturbingly, such aggregate data carries
with it a threat to personal privacy as well when private organizations
use such capabilities to assemble extensive knowledge about
individuals from widely distributed public records. Perhaps it will
come as no surprise that the Freedom of Information Act, designed to
allow the citizen to access records of the government, has, in the end,
been turned "on its head." Now the ability to aggregate small bits of
government-maintained personal information into comprehensive
individual files threatens the individual's privacy. And, when such
private compilations of data are sold back to the government, the very
laws designed to protect the citizen have, at last, been turned against
the citizen.
As Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age
shows, the Information Age is a time of unexpected and unintended
consequences when many fundamental assumptions and values seem
almost to turn on themselves. Above all, this is a time when Professor
Roberts' thoughtful book is most welcome to those who study, manage
or simply care deeply about the value of a means of achieving open
government.
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